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COMMENTARY

INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
INVESTMENT OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS: A
CAUTIONARY VIEW*
Jeffrey N. Gordon'
These papers, including ones presented earlier this
morning, raise questions about an adequate regime of
consumer protection in an era in which responsibility for
retirement savings and investment decisionmaking is being
devolved, increasingly, to individuals. This shift to individual
responsibility has also characterized many Social Security
reform proposals, previously a bedrock system of publiclydetermined benefit levels. I find this devolution troubling; I
think it is odd for individuals to have this responsibility.
Individuals are not good risk bearers of market volatility, both
in a financial sense and in a psychological sense. The
consequence is that unless individuals are locked into allequity portfolios, as Professor Weiss has suggested, they are
likely to pick inefficient portfolios that will not serve their
long-term interests. The evidence from current investment of
401(k) plans and other self-directed regiment plans is that
individuals tend to underweight equity and correspondingly
overweight fixed-income securities despite long-term horizons
1998 Jeffrey N. Gordon. All Rights Reserved. The following discussion is
presented in its original transcript format, with minor editorial changes by the
Author.
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of retirement savings. Thus, under present institutional
arrangements, the devolution trend is likely to erode the
retirement security and comfort of tomorrow's retirees.
Individuals are particularly poor at assessing and bearing
the intertemporal risks that arise because of the comparative
volatility of stocks versus bonds. This is true even if an
individual can appreciate that an all-equity portfolio will over
time almost certainly outperform an all-bond portfolio (and
outperform a mixed portfolio). (This superior performance of
equity portfolios over ten or fifteen year time periods has been
the historical experience in U.S. financial markets for more
than a century. The past does not predict the future, of course,
but in the end, no investment is "risk free.") The individual
faces volatility risk of uncertain dimension and is likely to
choose a portfolio overweighted in debt, reasoning thusly:
"Even if on average, stocks return more than bonds, I retire at
particular point in time; what will happen to the market value
of my (all equity) portfolio in the face of a market collapse?
Perhaps the market will rebound eventually, but in the
meantime I will be spending down the now-depressed value of
principal. Therefore, I will protect against that volatility risk
by investing heavily in bonds." Additionally, and no less
potently, the psychological evidence is that individuals will
overvalue losses relative to gains of equal size. This problem of
"loss aversion" makes it more difficult to invest in stocks,
where the daily fluctuations are widely reported, than in bonds
or other fixed income securities, where the fluctuations are less
and often simply not reported. (Try getting a bank to mark-tomarket a certificate of deposit or a guaranteed investment
contract.)
These reflections recall the famous essay of twenty years
ago by then-Professor now Dean Clark that mapped out the
four stages of investment management.' The general theme is
that the widening of the distribution of ownership of the
beneficial claims of securities has been accompanied by greater
specialization of the investment function. The first stage is
characterized by the individual entrepreneur. Management is
centralized and beneficial ownership is centralized because the

' Robert C. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment
Management Treatises, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 561 (1981).
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entrepreneur owns and controls it all. In the second stage,
ownership is separated from business management (in BerleMeans terms, the separation of ownership and control). In this
stage, capital comes in from dispersed investors who play no
role in the business, and the manager will not necessarily have
a large ownership stake. In stage three, what we might now
think of as the rise of institutional investors, "ownership" is
divided between those who supply capital (and who are
beneficial owners) and those who provide investment
management. Institutional investors serve as financial
intermediaries collecting capital from dispersed investors and
in turn invest it in specific companies. The capital suppliers
make neither managerial decisions over portfolio composition
nor over the portfolio companies in which they may be deemed
to have some beneficial stake.
Stage four is the crucial stage for our purposes. Clark
foresees the division of the "capital supplier" into the "savings
planner" on the one hand and the "beneficiary" on the other.
This stage gives beneficial ownership its widest distribution,
including all those who participate in retirement plans, even
while specialization pushes decisionmaking responsibility for
capital supply and investment management further away from
such beneficiaries. This is the subject of our conference: the
contours of this stage of capitalism with respect to savings
planning decisions and beneficial ownership.
It turns out that Dean Clark's sketch of stage four was
based on an incorrect premise. His conception was based, in
effect, on defined benefit plans, where firms were doing the
savings and investment planning on behalf of employees, and
firms were bearing the risk. Individuals were the beneficiaries
through their retirement benefits so the necessary regulatory
system was a consumer protection regime to guard against, for
example, bad investment decisionmaking by the firm and
pension plan insolvency. Clark did not foresee that employees
would actually be bearing the risk of their investment choices
and, indeed, accepting responsibility for making them. The
"fourth stage" now seems to entail a merging of some of the
investment functions that Clark imagined that specialization
in skill and risk-bearing capability would further separate.
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This new enthusiasm for devolution of risk bearing and
responsibility to individuals appears not just in the United
States but also in the U.K., as we have heard, and in other
places, and it may animate the various privatization proposals
for Social Security. It appears as part of a general social thrust
to shift risks to individuals, the disintermediation of risk.
Think, for example, of our changing attitudes about employee
layoffs in terms of shifting the risk of economic change or
depreciation of human capital investments from firms to
individuals. Assuming that there is no great wealth transfer
underway, it must be that gains from reduction in moral
hazard (the greater incentives that employees face to keep
skills fresh and relevant and job motivation high) overcome the
losses in comparative risk-bearing capacity. It is a grand social
experiment, facilitated at least in the U.S. by rising stock
markets and low unemployment levels and may be politically
sustainable only in such an environment.
Clark's reliance on the defined benefit plan as a keystone
to the fourth stage makes it worth reflecting upon defined
benefit plans, now in disfavor. Defined benefit plans have some
very desirable attributes. For one thing, such a plan efficiently
addresses the retirement income problem because its goal is to
provide an annuitized payout without the confounding bequest
motive. Defined benefit plans are partially an insurance
vehicle so that a beneficiary (including survivors) who dies
early does not collect (and cannot pass on) the full value of
accrued contributions, but that of course increases the payouts
for all others. A defined contribution plan, although also a
"retirement" plan, provides not only retirement income but a
bequest of the remainder interest. The replacement of the
insurance feature with a bequest feature reduces retirement
income and security, yet seems almost an accident of the
devolution of risk bearing from firms to individuals. The
defined benefit plan is also particularly attractive because the
benefit stream increases with the employee's salary over time
and is keyed to the employee's peak earnings years. Assuming
salary is influenced by a growing economy and greater firm
profits, this payout structure could be a vehicle for employee
gainsharing in the firm's prosperity.
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The defined benefit plan began to fall apart in the 1970s.
High inflation undercut the actuarial funding assumptions,
because the higher salaries (and thus the higher payout
obligations) came not from an increase in productivity or
profitability but because of increases in nominal wages. From
the employee perspective, as job mobility becomes more
important, the problems in a defined benefit plan of vesting,
portability, and tacking become more serious. The defined
benefit plan typically links payouts to the number of years
with the particular employer, so an employee who switches
among employers will receive less in total benefits than an
employee earning the same pay level throughout but who has
worked for a single employer. Unlike vesting, this problem has
not been solved. This anomaly is an argument in favor of
defined contribution plans, which naturally build in full
portability, but notice again the cost entailed to the individual
by the shift of risk of a shortfall in investment
This risk falls on individuals of quite different
performance.
economic sophistication and quite different apparent risk
appetites. The consequence, of course, is that individuals who
hold the same job and earn the same salary may receive
significantly different retirement incomes after they retire
because of portfolio allocation choices whose implications they
only dimly understand.
In a recent article, Employees, Pensions and the New
Economic Order,' I attempt to address some of these problems
by proposing a regulatory innovation to encourage employees
to invest defined contribution assets in the optimal all equity
portfolio. Employees need access to a financial vehicle that will
provide a hedge against the timing risk of converting an all
equity portfolio into a retirement annuity. Such a vehicle
should be possible to construct. Employees contribute to
pension accounts over time and retire over time; expected
returns from stocks are higher than expected returns from
bonds. It should be possible for a financial institution to
aggregate age cohorts and to pool the intertemporal gains and
risks of holding an all equity portfolio so as to improve on the
portfolios that most individual will create for themselves,
either because of a rational response to volatility risk or
2 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1519 (1997).
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because of heuristic mistakes. The goal is to create a selffunding insurance scheme, what might be called a "pension
equity collar," in which participants give up some of the
potential upside of an all-equity portfolio in exchange for
protections against the downside. The stability of returns
would be enhanced by the capacity to transfer funds across
cohorts as part of the intertemporal insurance and by the
continued contribution of employees who have not yet retired.
In a sense, this proposal tries to capture for employees in
defined contribution plans some of the risk-sharing elements of
defined benefit plans. Companies can invest pension fund
assets in ways that take advantage of the greater average
returns of stock because the intertemporal character of
employee claims and contributions buffer the volatility risk.
Defined contribution plans presently expose individuals to this
risk, but it need not be an inevitable attribute. Individuals can
recombine in ways to mitigate this risk and to facilitate the
holding of higher valued portfolios.
This sort of instrument is not now available in the
retirement plan market because of the complexity in working
out the details, the regulatory barriers, and the difficulty in
winning acceptance among employees for such a relatively
sophisticated innovation that addresses risk they may not be
aware of. My proposal is for the Department of Labor to
initiate a rulemaking to explore whether employers should be
required, as a condition for obtaining regulatory clearance in
their offering of a defined contribution plan, to offer an all
equity portfolio with a "pension equity collar." The goal is to
spur market innovation that will expand employees' retirement
savings choices and avoid unnecessary individual risk bearing.

